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 Abstract 
This paper offers a qualitative, case-study based analysis of hostile takeover bids 
mounted in the UK in the mid-1990s under the regime of the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers.  It is shown that during bids, directors of bid targets focus on 
the concerns of target shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholder groups. A 
review of the case studies five year on finds that that, almost without exception, 
mergers led to large-scale job losses and asset disposals. However, almost none of 
the bids was considered by financial commentators, at this point, to have generated 
shareholder value for investors in the merged company. While there is therefore clear 
evidence that the Takeover Code is effective in protecting the interests of target 
shareholders, the implications of the Code for efficiency in corporate performance 
are much less certain. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Corporations create economic value through the mutual specialization of human, 
physical and intangible assets.  The mechanisms of corporate governance are the 
means by which this economic surplus is realized.  The issue is how long-term 
economic relations involving complex commodities, repeat trades, and an uncertain 
contractual environment are governed, under circumstances where the invisible hand 
of the market functions less than perfectly to bring about efficient outcomes 
(Zingales, 1998; Deakin and Hughes, 1999).  The presence of multiple stakeholder 
groups whose inputs are required for production gives rise to overlapping and 
competing claims to share in the income stream which the firm generates.  In the 
(inevitable) presence of transaction costs there are limits to how far incentives can be 
perfectly aligned in advance through express contracting.   As a result there is scope 
for the mutual adjustment of claims at every stage of the economic relation.  The 
mechanisms of governance will be more or less successful depending on how well 
they resolve these distributional conflicts and thereby establish a basis for inter-
stakeholder cooperation. 
 
In the modern Anglo-American corporation, the predominant solution to this problem 
is to assign residual rights of ownership and control to the shareholders.  Of all the 
different corporate constituencies, shareholders, it is argued, have most at stake in the 
economic success or failure of the enterprise, and so they are most likely to act in a 
way which enhances the value of the productive venture as a whole, thereby 
benefiting all concerned (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  In addition, internal governance 
costs within the group of shareholders are low, precisely because they share the 
common goal of maximizing their financial return; there is less scope for costly 
divergencies of interest of the kind which arise between different employee or 
supplier groups.  The prevalence of the shareholder model in the USA and Britain 
is therefore said to represent the ‘survival’ of an efficient form of governance, at 
the expense of less efficient alternatives (Hansmann, 1996).  In this vein it is 
further argued that, as a result of globalisation, corporate governance systems are 
converging on the Anglo-American ‘shareholder primacy’ norm (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001).   
 
A contrary view is that the dominance of the shareholder primacy norm has 
potentially negative distributional implications for other stakeholder groups which 
in turn put in question its wider effects on corporate performance and national 
competitiveness. If prioritising returns to shareholders means that other 
  1stakeholders are less willing to risk firm-specific investments in human and 
physical capital than they would otherwise be, the negative effects on corporate 
performance will be felt more widely.  In the long run, shareholders would lose out 
too (Blair, 1995; Deakin and Slinger, 1997; Blair and Stout, 2000).  This can be 
read as implying that the shareholder primacy norm enjoys its elevated status in the 
Anglo-American systems to factors other than efficiency, such as institutional 
lock-in and other consequences of path dependence.  It also suggests that systems 
which do not observe the shareholder primacy norm are not necessarily, for that 
reason, suffering a competitive disadvantage. 
 
These issues are crystallized in the situation of the hostile takeover bid.  Supporters 
of an active market for corporate control claim that it serves to shift assets to more 
efficient uses while also enhancing the accountability of managers to shareholders.  
However, it has been suggested that the source of gains in takeovers derives not from 
the more efficient use of corporate assets post-merger, but from the ability of 
managers to breach with impunity the ‘implicit contracts’ of non-shareholder 
constituencies.  Because the expectations of employees and other constituencies with 
asset-specific investments are not adequately protected by law, they are vulnerable to 
a ‘breach of trust’ which serves to transfer wealth to shareholders at the expense of 
long-term performance of the enterprise (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). 
 
This paper offers a qualitative, empirical perspective on the operation of implicit 
contracts within takeover bids.  The evidence is drawn from case studies of hostile 
takeover bids mounted in the UK in the mid-1990s under the regime of the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers.  On the basis of interviews carried out following takeover 
bids, we report the perceptions of the bid process of market professionals and others 
involved, including company directors and employee representatives. We thereby 
provide evidence of the relative weight placed on particular regulatory factors by 
those involved in the takeover process, and of the perceived degree of influence of 
the different stakeholder groups.  We then look at the outcomes of the bids five years 
on.  We find that, almost without exception, successfully-completed takeovers led to 
large-scale job losses and asset disposals.  However, almost none of the bids was 
considered by financial analysts, at this point, to have generated shareholder value for 
investors in the merged company.   
 
The argument is developed as follows.  Section 2 below outlines the theoretical 
positions which have been taken within the law and economics literature on the role 
of implicit contracts and related mechanisms of corporate governance in the takeover 
  2context. Section 3 then outlines the contents of the City Code and evaluates its 
provisions from the point of view of the rival theoretical positions on implicit 
contracts and takeovers.  The Code’s provisions on equal treatment of shareholders, 
takeover defences, and the position of non-shareholder constituencies are for this 
purpose compared to those adopted in equivalent measures in the US and Germany, 
and reference is also made to the contents of the draft EC Directive on takeover bids 
(the ‘Thirteenth Directive’). Section 4 then reports the empirical findings of the 
empirical study of the operation of the Code and section 5 traces the subsequent 
history of mergers arising from the bids. In the concluding section we consider the 




2. Implicit contracts in hostile takeovers: the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis 
 
For its supporters, the hostile takeover mechanism serves to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders, thereby minimizing agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control in large, publicly-held corporations.  The 
appropriate response of management to a hostile bid is to adopt a position of 
‘passivity’ or ‘neutrality’, ruling out takeover defences and leaving the shareholders 
free to decide the fate of the company in the event of a bid (Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1991).  In so far as the target board is required to take any positive steps in response 
to the bid, its duties are confined to instigating an ‘auction’ based on competing 
offers, thereby ensuring that shareholder returns are maximized.  Some combination 
of these two positions – the ‘passivity’ and ‘auction’ views of the role of target 
management – represents the broad consensus within corporate finance and corporate 
governance scholarship and also among policy circles in Britain and America.   
 
A bidder is normally required to offer a market premium to the existing 
shareholders, in the form of an offer price well in excess of the current market 
value of the shares, if it is to be successful. The technical form in which this is 
done is called in the USA a ‘tender offer’ – this means an offer made directly to the 
shareholders, over the head of the board (by contrast, a ‘proxy fight’ involves the 
use of votes in a general meeting to replace the existing board with a new one). 
The equivalent of a tender offer is also the normal way of proceeding with a bid in 
the UK, under the rules of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.  The premium 
paid by the bidder as part of a tender offer may be justified by its confidence that it 
can the company can be run more efficiently after the merger has been completed.  
  3The logic of the bid is that at the time of the bid, the target’s share price has fallen 
below its potential value, thanks to mismanagement by the incumbent team.  This, 
at least, is the theory which lies behind the ‘passivity’ and ‘auction’ views.   
Empirical evidence, however, has proved resistant to the theory’s predictions. 
 
Since the late 1970s, the economic effects of takeovers have been the focus of 
intensive study. Econometric analyses have shown that it is not necessarily the 
worst performing companies which are targeted for takeover; in particular in the 
UK (and to a lesser extent in the United States) size is a more relevant factor (see 
Franks and Mayer, 2000). Nor do mergers following hostile bids consistently lead 
to improved performance. While hostile bids do better than agreed mergers, on 
average there is only a small positive effect on share prices from hostile takeovers 
(Cosh and Guest, 2001), and the range of outcomes is wide (Mueller and Sirower, 
1997).  Thus, while target shareholders undoubtedly do well from hostile takeover 
bids, shareholders in bidder companies, on average, make only slight gains, if that.  
Such evidence puts in doubt the theoretical claim that hostile takeovers enhance 
the efficiency and competitiveness of organizations. 
 
An alternative explanation for the high takeover premiums paid to target 
shareholders was provided by the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis developed by André 
Shleifer and Lawrence Summers in a much discussed paper published in 1988.  
The paper was developed against the backdrop of the activities of corporate 
‘raiders’ such as T. Boone Pickens and Carl Icahn who were active in US takeover 
markets in the mid-1980s.  Several hostile bids mounted at this time led to large-
scale job losses in organisations where employment security had previously been a 
stated priority of management.   
 
The key to the ‘breach of trust’ hypothesis was the analysis of implicit contracts.  
According to the theory, employees are willing to make firm-specific investments 
in human capital in return for an implicit promise of job security which amounts to 
a return on their ‘investment’.  Firm-specific human capital in this context means 
‘skills or knowledge or networks of personal relationships that are specialized to a 
given enterprise and that are more valuable in that enterprise than they would be in 
alternative uses’ (Blair, 1996: 8). Because of such specialization, employees 
become ‘locked in’ to a particular enterprise. They thereby become vulnerable to 
ex post renegotiation of implicit contract terms by management.  In the context of a 
hostile takeover, downsizing enables management to capture the future ‘rents’ or 
income streams which would otherwise have accrued to employees, and to convert 
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directly benefits shareholders only at the employees’ expense, it is a simple wealth 
transfer.  Its impact on productive efficiency is at best neutral, but more likely 
negative.  As Margaret Blair (1996: 12) puts it,  
 
Firms that focus solely on share value will have an incentive to shut 
down operations that are not generating profits for shareholders even 
though these operations may still be generating substantial real 
economic rents.  From the point of view of society at large, this is, 
obviously, inefficient.  Moreover, over time such policies are likely to 
discourage further investments by employees in firm-specific human 
capital. 
 
The Shleifer and Summers paper identified the hostile takeover as the principal 
mechanism by which the redistribution of wealth from employees to shareholders 
takes places. As long as the incumbent management remains in place, implicit 
contracts with employees are enforced through reputational effects. Companies 
which renege on expectations of continuing employment will be unable to motivate 
existing employees or attract new ones. However, following a successful bid, a 
new management team comes in and finds itself in a different position. The new 
team aims to realize short-term gains to meet the costs of the takeover through 
asset disposals which, in themselves, reduce the need to attract and retain 
employees. In effect, the post-bid restructuring places the parties in an endgame 
situation, where implicit contracts ceased to be self-enforcing.  The effect was 
summed up as follows (Shleifer and Summers, 1988: 44): 
 
Hostile takeovers are external means of removing managers who 
uphold stakeholder claims. Takeovers then allow shareholders to 
appropriate stakeholders’ ex post rents in the implicit contracts.  The 
gains are split between the shareholders of the acquired and the 
acquiring firms. At least in part, therefore, the gains are wealth 
redistributing and not wealth creating. 
 
Yet a similar argument could equally well have been made in the case of 
shareholders. The ‘nexus of contracts’ view of the corporation sees managers as 
the agents of the shareholders, running the enterprise on their behalf with the aim 
of achieving a return on their investment.  This ‘contract’ (which in legal terms can 
be thought of as consisting of the terms of the memorandum and articles of 
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contract, is potentially open-ended, and similarly subject to unforeseen 
contingencies.  However, in each of the cases considered by Shleifer and Summers, 
there was a fundamental difference in treatment (not referred to in the paper) 
between shareholders and employees which arose from the prevailing institutional 
framework. Shareholder expectations were just as ‘implicit’ as those of employees, 
but shareholder’s claims were protected by corporate and (in particular) securities 
law in a way which had no equivalent for employees.    
 
Enforcement of implicit contracts through reputational effects is very far from 
being the whole story. Understandings which are implicit ex ante may become 
explicit ex post through the device of a property rule which grants residual 
decision-making power to one party.  Thus at the point of deciding the fate of the 
company in response to an outside bid for control, in Britain and the USA, residual 
control rights are asserted in such a way as to ensure that shareholders, and only 
shareholders, get to decide. In order to explain the differential treatment of 
shareholders and employees, it is necessary to examine these institutional origins 
of shareholder primacy in the Anglo-American systems in more detail. 
 
 
3. Institutional support for shareholder primacy: directors’ duties, takeover 
codes and employee voice 
 
There is only limited legal support for the shareholder primacy norm within the 
core of corporate law.  In UK company law, directors, when taking commercial 
decisions, are said to owe a duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company. In the USA, Delaware corporate law (the choice of legal regime for most 
large US companies) has an essentially similar rule, although it is sometimes 
phrased more explicitly as a duty owed to the members, that is, the shareholders.  
Both UK law and Delaware law allow directors leeway to take into account the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, to the extent that this is done with the 
aim of enhancing shareholder value. The DTI Company Law Review, which was 
completed in 2002, referred to this as the idea that directors are entitled to pursue 
‘enlightened shareholder value’; its proposed restatement of directors’ duties 
‘requires directors to act in the collective best interests of shareholders, but 
recognises that this can only be achieved by taking due account of wider interests’ 
(Company Law Review Steering Committee, 2000: 14-15). Section 309 of the 
Companies Act 1985 already requires directors to consider the interests of 
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duties.  In the US, a large number of states passed so-called ‘stakeholder statutes’ 
in the 1980s which shielded boards from potential liability to shareholders in 
respect of decisions including responses to takeover bids.  Although Delaware was 
not among these states, its judges have, from time to time, stressed that boards 
have scope to balance the interests of different stakeholders in the overall interests 
of the company as a productive entity.
1  Procedural rules and protections for 
directors against suit also confer considerable discretion on boards.  Shareholder 
litigation is very rare in the UK thanks to procedural bars including the rule in Foss 
v. Harbottle.
2  Under Delaware law, a generously wide ‘business judgment rule’ 
protects directors from personal litigation in most cases where they can shown to 
have acted in good faith.   
 
Looking purely at the general principles of corporate law, target boards have 
considerable leeway to resist hostile takeover bids, almost to the extent of adopting 
a ‘just say no’ policy.  Indeed, until comparatively recently, boards in both the US 
and the UK did precisely this.  During the 1930s, UK boards routinely dismissed 
outsiders’ attempts to prise away control, often not even informing shareholders 
that a bid was on the table.  Directors of listed companies insisted that negotiations 
with bidders had to be conducted on a confidential basis (Hannah, 1974; Njoya, 
2002: 144-5).   
 
The position began to change as the consequence of the revolution in securities law 
and accounting practice which began in the US with the passage of federal 
securities legislation in the 1930s (the Securities Act 1933 and Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934) and in the UK with the Companies Act 1948.  These 
measures, together with the gradual development of stock exchange rules, required 
companies to disclose a wider range of information in their published accounts and 
to inform the regulatory authorities of a increasingly large category of material 
changes in commercial circumstances.  Hostile takeovers were a response to this 
new regulatory regime which began to gather momentum in the late 1950s and 
increased in significance in the course of the 1960s.  From an early stage, there was 
concerted pressure from shareholder groups for regulatory intervention to protect 
their interests. In the UK this led to the issuing in 1959 of the Notes on 
Amalgamations of British Businesses, a code of conduct drawn up with the 
encouragement of the Bank of England.  This laid down the principle that the 
decision to sell or retain shares was a matter for the shareholder, who was entitled, 
in making that decision, to receive all relevant information from the board of the 
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City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which was drawn up and administered by a 
self-regulatory body, the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.  Also in 1968 the 
US adopted federal legislation, the William Act, which amended the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.  In common with the trend in the UK, the Williams Act 
introduced disclosure requirements in connection with takeover bids, with the aim 
of protecting shareholder interests. 
 
Since the late 1960s the City Code has evolved to encompass a substantial body of 
principles and rules relating to the conduct of takeover bids.  Formally, the Code is 
‘soft law’ which depends for its enforcement on the threat that an individual found 
to be in breach of its provision may lose the necessary license to practise in the 
area of investment business in the UK. This is a sufficiently powerful threat to 
ensure near-complete compliance with rulings of the Panel.  The power is currently 
exercised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which has endorsed the City 
Code as a relevant instrument of self-regulation under the terms of section 143 the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The involvement of the FSA, a statutory 
body, does not diminish the essentially self-regulatory character of the Panel, 
which consists of representatives from a number of financial organizations and 
professional associations in the City of London. 
 
The Code is founded on a principle of equal treatment of shareholders: ‘all 
shareholders of the same class of an offeree company must be treated similarly by the 
offeror’.
3 This means that ‘partial bids’ which discriminate between classes of 
shareholders are forbidden.  The Code’s ‘mandatory bid rule’ requires the bidder, 
once it has acquired 30% or more of the voting rights of the company, to grant all 
shareholders the chance to sell for the highest price it has paid for shares of the 
relevant kind within the offer period and the 12 months preceding it.
4  Likewise, the 
Code stipulates that information given out by either the bidder or target directors 
must be made ‘equally available to all shareholders as nearly as possible at the same 
time and in the same manner’.
5  The Code also imposes on target directors a series of 
specific obligations.  They must obtain competent, independent financial advice on 
the merits of the offer,
6 which they must then circulate to the shareholders with their 
own recommendation.
7  Any document issued by the board of either the bidder or the 
target must be accompanied by a statement that the directors accept responsibility for 
the information contained in it. The effect of this is to create a legal duty of care, 
owed by the directors to the shareholders to whom the information is issued, and not 
to the company as is the case with their general fiduciary duties.
8  In effect, then, the 
  8directors of the target in the position of being required to give disinterested advice on 
the merits of the offer.   
 
The Takeover Code is not silent on the interests of other stakeholders. General 
Principle 9 states that ‘it is the shareholders’ interests, taken as a whole, together with 
those of employees and creditors, which should be considered when the directors are 
giving advice to shareholders’.
9 In addition rule 24.1 requires the bidder to signify, in 
its offer document, ‘its intentions regarding the continuation of the business of the 
offeree company; its intentions regarding any major changes to be introduced in the 
business, including any redeployment of the fixed assets of the offeree company; the 
long-term commercial justification for the proposed offer; and its intentions with 
regard to the continued employment of the employees of the offeree company and its 
subsidiaries’.
10 However, these provisions do little to counter-balance the specific 
duties of disclosure owed to shareholders under the Code.  General Principle 9 is no 
more enforceable by employees than is section 309 of the Companies Act.
11  
Employees have no standing to make representations before the City Panel.   
Moreover, the statement of future intentions which rule 24.1 requires of the bidder is 
unlikely, in itself, to give rise to any legal commitments. In practice, it is easily 
satisfied by a boilerplate formula inserted into offer documents, according to which 
the bidder simply undertakes to observe the employees’ pre-existing legal rights, 
something which is little more than a statement of the obvious in this particular 
context. 
 
The Code, together with other aspects of securities law, also hampers potential anti-
takeover defences in various ways.  Once an offer is made or if the target board has 
reason to believe that it is about to be made, the target board cannot issue new shares; 
issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares; create securities carrying 
rights of conversion into shares; sell, dispose or acquire assets of a material amount, 
or contract to do so; or ‘enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
business’.
12  The ‘proper purposes’ doctrine of company law likewise prevents the 
board issuing shares for the purpose of forestalling a hostile takeover, even well in 
advance of any bid being made.
13  The issuing of non-voting stock, which a board 
might do in an attempt to entrench its control, is permissible as a matter of company 
law, but has been vigorously opposed by organized shareholder interests, as 
expressed through the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee’s code of practice.
14  
Under both company legislation and the rules of the UK Listing Authority, 
companies must take actives steps to contract out of protection for pre-emption 




The overall effect of the Code is that the open-ended duty of directors to act in good 
faith in the interests of the company is, for the duration of the takeover bid, 
transmuted into a specific duty to have regard to the immediate financial interests of 
the shareholders. The board is required to be neutral during the bid, and may only 
with difficulty erect takeover defences in advance; hence management ‘passivity’ is, 
by and large, the order of the day.  Its obligation to provide an objective assessment 
of any bid implies a limited duty to hold the ring during an auction but it is not 
required to take active steps to solicit additional bids.   
 
US law on takeovers is broadly similar to that in the UK, although it is tilted more 
clearly in the direction of an auction rule rather than a rule of neutrality or passivity, 
and there are significant institutional differences which have implications for the way 
in which takeover bids are conducted.  The Williams Act is less extensive as a 
regulatory instrument than the Takeover Code. It does not impose a bid timetable as 
the Code does, and its impact on takeover defences is less far-reaching. The main 
effect of the Act is to require information disclosure and to impose (from 1995 
onwards) a version of the equal treatment principle, under which the tender offers 
must be made available to all shareholders of  the relevant class.   
 
The closest equivalents to the Code’s provisions on defences and treatment of 
stakeholders are to be found in the Delaware case law, the result of the more 
prominent role played by shareholder litigation in the US system.  Contrary to the 
position in the UK, the Delaware courts allow target boards to put in place ‘poison 
pills’ or shareholder rights plans which require bidders to buy out existing interests at 
an enhanced premium or, with the same result, have the effect of diluting the bidder’s 
own stock following the acquisition.  Under Unocal
16 the Delaware Supreme Court 
effectively operates a proportionality test, by virtue of which a defensive measure 
will be protected by the business judgment rule if it is ‘reasonable to the threat 
posed’.  The directors are entitled to conduct an analysis of the impact of the bid on 
the corporate enterprise, taking into account factors which include ‘inadequacy of the 
price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
“constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, employees, and perhaps even 
the community generally), the risk of nonconsumption, and the quality of securities 
being offered in the exchange’.  Notwithstanding this dictum, in Revlon
17 the Court 
ruled that a particular kind of takeover defence – a ‘lock up’ of assets, such as giving 
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own offer fail – was subject to a special test.  This kind of device would be 
acceptable only if the effect was to elicit an auction between competing bidders, 
rather than deterring potential bids.  The court came close to articulating a an 
exclusive shareholder interest test by ruling that, once the sale of control to one 
bidder or another becomes ineveitable, the board’s only duty is to ensure that 
shareholder receive the highest value possible for their stakes.   Later decisions
18 
have demonstrated the Delaware courts’ continuing ability to ‘zig zag’ between pro- 
and anti-defensive rulings (Roe, 1993), a quality which helps to ensure that neither of 
the two core constituencies to which Delaware has to appeal – managers and 
institutional shareholders – is sufficiently alienated to consider pressing for 
reincorporation in a more ‘friendly’ jurisdiction.
19 
 
In the US context, then, it would seem that regulatory competition between the states, 
some of which are willing to adjust their corporate laws to attract reincorporations, 
has resulted in a particular configuration of takeover law, under which takeover 
defences in the form of poison pills are permissible.  There are two schools of 
thought on the effects of this evolution.  One maintains that as a result of the leeway 
allowed to poison pills, Delaware law is unduly pro-management, the consequence of 
the need to appeal to incumbent managers who have the all-important say in where 
the company is to be incorporated (Bebchuk and Ferrell, 2002).  The other, by 
contrast, evaluates the process of regulatory arbitrage in a more positive light, by 
suggesting that the Delaware rule permits poison pills, by and large, only to the 
extent compatible with the goal of maximizing shareholder choice in the event of a 
takeover; poison pills are in general legitimate only to the extent that they are 
redeemable, so that rather than posing an insurmountable barrier to an external bid, 
they merely increase the price which a bidder is required to pay (Kahan and Rock, 
2002).   
 
While it is difficult to resolve this debate in the absence of more compelling evidence 
of the efficiency effects of poison pills, the comparison with the UK position is 
instructive from a public choice point of view.  The UK lacks a similar mechanism of 
regulatory competition to that which operates in the USA.  The City Code, in 
articulating a strongly pro-shareholder position the issue of on management passivity, 
reflects the influence which institutional shareholders and City professionals have 
been able to bring to bear on the regulatory process.  It is largely thanks to concerted 
shareholder pressure that poison pills and the more obvious kinds of takeover 
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anything approaching the levels seen in the USA.   
 
It is also clear that neither system has generated processes which would have the 
effect of protecting stakeholders against the threat of expropriation postulated by the 
‘breach of trust’ hypothesis.  The Revlon decision suggests that stakeholder 
considerations will tend to take second place once it is clear that the company will be 
auctioned off to the highest bidder.  In the UK, the same effect arises from the 
absence of any standing for employee representatives in the City Panel’s processes of 
adjudication and rule-making.  Nor does employment law provide a substitute 
remedy in either system.  In the context of US federal labour law, restructurings and 
reorganisations of the enterprise which result from commercial transactions such as 
takeovers are not covered by the employer’s duty to bargain under the National 
Labor Relations Act
20 (and in any event mandatory collective bargaining covers less 
than 10% of the US private sector workforce).  The equivalent UK provisions are 
those parts of employment law which impose a duty on the employer to inform and 
consult employee representatives in situations of redundancy and business transfers.
21  
Although the sale of a business or part of a business triggers a duty to consult, there is 
no such duty merely in the event of a hostile bid being mounted; neither the target 
nor the company is obliged to consult at this point.  The rules of the UK Listing 
Authority, which mandate prompt disclosure of material information to shareholders, 
also make it difficult for companies to consult employee representatives over the 
substance of large-scale restructurings at en early stage in the decision-making 
process. 
 
The approach taken by the German Takeover Law, in force from 1 January 2002, 
highlights, by comparison, the marginalisation of employee voice in the Anglo-
American systems.  Section 33 of the new law permits the target management to put 
in place anti-takeover defences if they are either supported by a 75% vote of the 
shareholders, or authorized in advance by the supervisory board.  This last reference 
is highly significant as, in the case of companies subject to the codermination laws, 
employees have equal representation with shareholders on the supervisory board, and 
in some cases the casting vote will be exercised by a non-shareholder chair.  Section 
33 had initially required shareholder approval for defensive measures in all cases, but 
was redrafted at a very late stage in the legislative process to incorporate the 
alternative of authorization through the supervisory board.  Richard Painter and 
Christian Kirchner comment (2002: 15) that ‘[t]his change in section 33 was clearly 
motivated by protectionist forces, forged together by certain management interests 
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codetermination’.  Whether or not the measure is any more ‘protectionist’ in favour 
of labour than the City Code is in favour of shareholders, it would seem that the 
feature of German corporate governance which most clearly distinguishes it from its 
British and American counterparts, namely the incorporation of employee voice 
directly into corporate decision making and lines of accountability, has here come to 
be reflected (at least thus far) in the takeover regulation regime (see also Höpner and 
Jackson, 2002). 
 
A further contrast is provided by the proposed EU Thirteenth Company Law 
Directive.  This measures aims to put in place a harmonizing set of rules for 
shareholder protection which are essentially inspired by the City Code.   The 
Directive would outlaw bid-frustrating tactics by target boards, require the target 
board to obtain neutral financial advice on the merits of a bid, and impose various 
duties on bidders, including an obligation of equal treatment with regard to 
shareholders of the target, thereby ruling out ‘coercive’ bids.  When a revised draft 
of the Directive was considered by the European Parliament in late 2000, the 
Parliament insisted that the implications of takeovers for employment should play 
a part in the assessment of bids.  It also rejected the European Commission’s view 
that the correct attitude for the target board to take during a bid was one of 
‘neutrality’.  The Commission responded by insisting that employee consultation 
was not an appropriate objective for the Directive, and (somewhat 
disingenuously
22) claimed that adequate protection was already provided by the 
Acquired Rights Directive.
23  A Conciliation Committee was set up to mediate 
between the Commission and the Parliament on this and other matters.  This led to 
agreement on a new set of amendments which (among other things) would have 
required the board of the target company to set out its ‘views on the effects of the 
[bid] on all the interests of the company, including employment, and on the 
offeror’s strategic planning for the offeree company and its likely impact on jobs 
and locations’; the board of the bidder would have been required to issue a similar 
statement, relating to its intentions. This fell short of a requirement on either 
company to enter into consultations with employee representatives.  When the 
Directive was finally put to the vote in July 2001, the result was a tie (273 votes on 
each side), which meant that the proposal fell.
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Notwithstanding this failure, the Internal Market Directorate of the European 
Commission has made clear its intention to resurrect the draft Directive.  In 
January 2002 it published the report of a high level group of company law experts 
  13(European Commission, 2002). This report sidestepped the issue of employee 
consultation on the grounds that while ‘the interests of other stakeholders and in 
particular of employees may be at stake in the context of a takeover bid, [the 
group] believes that this in itself does not justify measures by the board which 
deny shareholders the opportunity to successfully tender their shares to a bidder 
who is willing to buy their shares’ (European Commission, 2002: 16). In this 
context, it would seem to be significant the Thirteenth Directive is an internal 
market measure, over which the Directorate General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, which is responsible for employee consultation measures, has no say.   
Since the report of the high level group, a judgment of the European Court of 
Justice, ruling that the retention by governments of ‘golden shares’ in privatized 
corporations could contravene EC rules on state aids to industry, has put further 
pressure on the Parliament to reach agreement on the text of the Thirteenth 
Directive. 
 
In short, the City Code embodies in a particularly clear way the principle that, 
during the course of a takeover bid, directors of the target company are meant to 
act as the agents of the shareholders. Appeals to ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
are of little relevance in this context; the shareholders are entitled to the protection 
of their short-term financial interests. It would appear, then, the claims of non-
shareholder constituencies to the protection of their implicit contractual interests in 
the corporate enterprise as a continuing productive entity count for little.  The 
position appears to be starkly pro-shareholder not simply by reference to recent 
German practice, but also by comparison to the US position, which allows certain 
poison pill defences (although, it would seem, only to the extent that they lead to a 
higher immediate return to the shareholders).  We now turn to an examination of 
how the City Code works in practice. 
 
4.  Empirical evidence: a qualitative study of takeover process 
 
4.1 The study: aims, methods, scope 
 
Although there are literally hundreds of econometric analyses of aspects of hostile 
takeover bids, the breach of trust hypothesis has been relatively little studied using 
this methodology.  The quantitative methods which are used to measure the effects of 
bids upon shareholder wealth are not able to specify whether those gains came from 
increased productive efficiency or wealth transfers. One study, which found evidence 
that hostile takeovers  in the UK between 1987 and 1996 were associated with 
  14significant falls in both employment and output, concluded that, after controlling for 
the change in output, the overall effect of such mergers was to enhance the efficiency 
with which labour was utilized at firm level.  On this basis the paper claimed that ‘the 
results are generally supportive of the view that merger activity, particularly related 
and hostile merger activity, promotes efficiency’.  However, the authors also 
accepted that ‘if the observed employment reductions constitute a reneging on the 
implicit terms of the labour contract, in the sense of Shleifer and Summers (1988), 
there may be associated costs generated through the subsequent reductions in firm-
specific human capital investment by employees.  These will be manifested in lower 
output levels but any such changes would be very hard to identify’ (Conyon et al., 
2002: 40).   
 
To make progress in understanding the effects of hostile takeovers and of takeover 
law, there is scope for alternative methods including qualitative analyses and case 
studies.  These can provide richer information on the motivations and perceptions of 
those affected by bids and on the potential range of trajectories of companies 
following bids than is available from econometric studies which are, by definition, 
remote from these kinds of data.  In this vein, the present paper reports the findings of 
a qualitative study of hostile takeovers and their aftermath. The first aim was to 
analyse how the takeover process and takeover regulation, including the City Code, 
structured the consideration by boards of different stakeholder interests.  A non-
random sample of 15 takeover bids was identified for close study.  The objective was 
to construct a sample of bids which contained examples of both hostile and agreed 
bids, and cross-border bids by UK companies and for UK companies mounted during 
the period 1993-1996.  Interviews were conducted with company directors, legal and 
financial advisers and trade union officials in the relevant companies.  During 1993-
96 over 40 interviews were conducted with institutional investors, company 
directors, employee representatives, lawyers, merchant bankers and representatives 
of various official market bodies (including the Association of British Insurers and 
the Takeover Panel).  The purpose of this stage of the research was to assess how 
those directly involved in takeover bids perceived their effects, in particular their 
distributional implications for the different stakeholder groups.  In 2001, a further 
sub-sample of companies was revisited for the purpose of assessing how, several 
years after the bid, the takeover was now viewed.
25   
 
By way of background to the study, it useful to note some features of the takeover 
wave of the mid-1990s, of which our sample of bids formed a part.  From a peak in 
1989, the UK takeover market became relatively quiet during the early 1990s. This 
  15slump ended dramatically with an explosive increase in takeover value – rather 
than numbers of bids – in 1995 and 1996. A few extremely large hostile takeover 
bids were seen, most notably Glaxo/Wellcome and Lloyds/TSB. In value terms, 
the market for corporate control became as important in the mid-1990s as it had 
been in the late 1980s. Features of the market in the mid-1990s included a huge 
jump in the value of continental European acquisitions in the UK, and a septupling 
in the value of UK public deals from £5 billion in 1994 to a then record £36 billion 
in 1995. 
 
Table 1 charts hostile bids as a proportion of all bids for the period in question and 
indicates the overall incidence and success rates of bids.  Table 2 lists details of the 
15 bids which formed the sample.  This indicates the pre-bid prices, the first and 
final offers, the bid timetables (relevant dates), the composition of offers (cash, 
shares and debt), the takeover premiums paid in successful bids, and the outcomes 
of bids.   
  16Table 1.  Incidence and success rates of UK Public Takeover Bids, 1993-1996 
 
UK Public Bids  
1993-1996 












Contested  Agreed  Totals 
1993:  Completed  2 3 5  51 2  53     58 
  Failed  6 0 6  4 0  4     10 
Success Rate (%):     45.5%      93.0%     85% 
  Total:  8 3  11  55 2  57  16.2% 83.8%  68 
1994:  Completed  6 2 8  55 0  55     63 
  Failed  3 0 3  6 0  6     9 
Success Rate (%):     72.7%     90.2%     88% 
  Total:  9 2  11  61 0  61  15.3% 84.7%  72 
1995:  Completed  6 4  10  75 2  77     87 
0  Failed  7* 1  8  5 0  5     13 
Success Rate (%):     55.6%     93.9%     87% 
  Total:  13 5 18  80 2  82  18.0% 82% 100 
1996:  Completed  8 2  10  77 0  77     87 
  Failed  5 0 5  5 1  6     11 
Success Rate (%):     66.7%     92.8%     88% 
  Total:  13 2 15  82 1  83  15.3% 84.7%  98 
1993-96 Totals:   
  Completed  22 11 33  258 4  262     295 
  Failed  21 1 22  20 1  21     43 
Success Rate:     60%     92.6%     87.3% 
  Totals:  43  12  55  278  5  283  16.2%  83.8%  338 
 
Source: Mergers and Acquisitions Monthly, 1992-1997. 
 
* Includes 3 bids in a new category: ‘recommendation given then withdrawn,’ which was not 
mentioned before the report on 1995. 
 
Note: The category ‘initially contested, then agreed,’ was not used prior to the report on 1992. 
These bids have been counted as hostile bids. 
 
  17Table 2.  Dates, prices, takeover premiums and results in selected takeover bids 1993-1996 
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  194.2  Perceptions of the regulatory process 
 
We asked market participants for a description of a particular bid, and in that 
particular instance, their opinions about the effects of the regulatory system: 
company law, the Takeover Code, European law, tax law and the MMC. 
Interviewees answered whether a particular factor had or had not affected the 
outcome of a bid.  The Takeover Code and related Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares were rated as an important factor by 90% of respondents, 
the highest score of any single factor (see Figure 1).  A quarter of all respondents 
considered that regulatory factors had affected the outcome of the bid.  Regulatory 
factors were thought to be more likely to have this effect in the case of hostile 
takeovers. 
 
We then asked interviewees whether consideration and priority had been given to 
shareholders, employees and creditors. All 33 responding interviewees thought that 
directors had ‘considered’ shareholders’ interests. In the 31 of these cases where 
‘priority’ was addressed, the result was again unanimous that shareholders had 
been given priority. At the other end of the scale, ‘priority’ was never given to 
creditors, and ‘consideration’ was only thought to have been given to this group in 
a few cases - merchant bankers discussing agreed bids were the most likely to 
report that consideration had been given to creditors. While 31% of all respondents 
reported that employees had been given priority, this result depended on high 
ratings from trade union representatives (80%) and directors (50%) rather than 
lawyers (8%), and on a large number reporting priority to employees in agreed bids 
(55%) rather than hostile bids (13%).  
 
The effects of the bid were then analysed using questions which asked about net 
benefit or net loss to various groups on each side of the bid.  Respondents had to 
assimilate gains and losses to individual groups and even to individuals – for 
example to employees or directors who might have lost their jobs, but who 
experienced capital gains from shareholding value rises and from redundancy pay-
offs.  While 100% of respondents considered that target shareholders gained from 
bids, only around 40% considered that target employees did so. Table 3 reports 
these results and Figure 2 represents the means of the perceived effects on different 
groups.
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Table 3. Effects of the merger on different groups 
Benefit %  No effect %  Lose out %  Cases   Group 
    
Shareholders Bidder  64.5  25.8  9.7  31 
 Target  100.0  0.0  0.0  31 
Employees  Bidder  19.0 66.7 14.3  21 
  Target  23.1 38.5 38.5  26 
Managers  Bidder  21.1 63.2 15.8  19 
  Target  19.2 38.5 42.3  26 
Directors Bidder  50.0  44.4  5.6  18 
  Target  30.8 23.1 46.2  26 
Suppliers Bidder  0.0  77.8  22.2  18 
  Target  16.7 54.2 29.2  24 
Customers Bidder  43.5  56.5  0.0  23 
 Target  63.0  33.3  3.7  27 
Banks Bidder  36.4  59.1  4.5  22 
  Target  25.0 62.5 12.5  24 
Bondholders  Bidder  0.0 100.0 0.0  18 
 Target  10.5  84.2  5.3  19 
Competitors Bidder  4.8  38.1  57.1  21 
 Target  4.2  41.7  54.2  24 
Local 
community 
Bidder  16.7 66.7 16.7  18 
  Target  21.7 56.5 21.7  23 
Advisors  Bidder 87.5  8.3 4.2 24 


















Shareholders Employees Managers Directors Suppliers Customers Banks Bondholders Competitors Advisors
Bidders Targets
 
  23In interviews we put the same question to company directors, lawyers, 
merchant bankers, institutional shareholders and employee representatives: 
 
Did directors’ duties to consider interests of creditors and 
employees as well as those of shareholders affect the 
preparations for, the conduct of and the aftermath of the bid? 
 
On the central question of directors’ duties, the response was almost 
invariably that while directors might consider employees’ and creditors’ 
interests, the outcome of a bid was determined by shareholder value. 
Shareholder value took precedence over all other considerations. The 
responses to the question are separated out below by group, with advisers 
first, followed by directors, employee representatives, and institutional 
investors.  
 
Comments from advisers were as follows.  Some of these acknowledged a 
need to communicate to employees, but without exception they indicated 
that employees’ interests play little role in the deliberations of directors 
during a bid.  According to one interviewee, ‘in a takeover situation, the 
duty to act in the interests of the company effectively means a duty to act in 
the interests of the shareholders of the time: not present and future.  Section 
309 of the Companies Act and General Principle 9 of the Code are not so 
important’.  Another commented, ‘the effect of General Principle 9 is that 
you are given permission to temper your pursuit of your shareholders’ 
interests with your employees’ interests. It is used as an argument but never 
really has an influence on the outcome’.  More generally, there was 
widespread agreement that it was the duty of directors to deliver advice to 
shareholders on the valuation or valuations which they were being offered.  
A typical comment was as follows: 
 
Directors do consider employees’ interests, but no-one really 
knows what that means. At the margin the touchy-feely things 
matter, but the board of directors, faced with 2 people offering 
£1 and £1.10 must go for the higher. The decision, of course, is 
not usually put like that, but I don’t know of any cases where 
employees’ interests have come first. 
 
Aside from cases of companies in financial distress, when the position 
of creditors and employees would come under consideration, employees 
were only mentioned out of lip service to the obligation in rule 24.1 to 
state intentions with regard to the treatment of pre-existing rights: 
 
  24Directors’ duties to consider other interests are rarely an issue 
unless the company is near to insolvency. These clauses 
together are a bit of a sop. Rule 24 of the Code requires a 
statement of intentions towards employees, which always gets 
reduced to the standard phrase: ‘the bidder will ensure that all 
rights of the target employees will be met in full.’ Sometimes 
people do say more - sometimes a target will screw a stronger 
statement out of the bidder. And where companies intend not to 
make redundancies, they will tend to say it. 
 
More pithily, ‘much is spoken about directors’ duties to employees, but it is 
rarely relevant’; in this context, ‘the Takeover Code and Companies Acts 
just muddle these issues up: directors have to recommend ‘the deal’ when 
they are really just recommending the price.’ 
 
Directors were also asked whether directors’ duties to consider the interests 
of employees, creditors and the company as a whole had influenced the 
company’s actions.  Most expressed ignorance of this formulation of 
directors’ duties (‘[t]hese were not especially relevant in this case’) or 
considered such duties irrelevant (‘[w]e checked these, but there were none 
of any special relevance to this case’).  In only a minority  of cases was a 
role for consultation was acknowledged: ‘[t]here was consultation with 
employee representatives as soon as the merger was announced (both with 
trade unions and with staff associations)’.   By contrast, several interviewees 
perceived a major role for directors’ duties, with the focus, generally, on 
shareholder interests.  Advisers played a particularly important role in 
focusing attention on the financial aspects of a bid: 
 
The one thing that [our merchant bankers] kept saying was that 
‘you have to be sure that when you say that a price is 
inadequate, you mean it and can back it up.’  Were we advised 
that we could take into account the interests of the company as 
a whole?  No - the primary advice was that ‘there is a price at 
which you have to say yes.’  
 
In addition, non-executive directors were identified as advocates for the 
shareholder interest, even where this meant dismembering the corporate 
enterprise:  
 
Were we advised of our legal obligations to our shareholders? 
Yes - there was lots of advice.  One of the non-executive 
directors did push us hard to consider closure and selling up as 
  25an option to get maximum shareholder value (about 5 years 
before the bid). 
 
Exceptionally, in one case where a utility company’s future had been at 
stake, shareholders did not perceive their own financial interests to be the 
priority: 
 
[An American investment trust manager] arrived at the 
extraordinary general meeting at the City Hall and tried to 
explain why he was looking for shareholder value. He started 
by saying that he was a marine and that he had fought 
alongside the Royal Marines, or in Vietnam or some such, and 
that he invested funds on behalf of the widows and orphans of 
New York City. Well, he just got shouted down. 
 
Institutional investors likewise thought that directors should be aware of 
their fiduciary and other duties during a bid.  One was ‘happy with the idea 
that directors owe duties to “the company” but was of the view that ‘during 
a bid, especially, the directors understand this as being a duty to 
shareholders.’  Another considered that for directors to perform according to 
their fiduciary duties, ‘they had to show that it was in the interests of 
shareholders to sell’.  The pursuit of stakeholder interests was not seen as a 
viable alternative to shareholder value: 
 
It is hard to make a case that [the duty further the interests of 
the company as a whole] affected the bid greatly.  In principle a 
defending company might put employees’ interests before 
those of shareholders but they are basically serving 
shareholders’ interests first.  If directors have a duty, it is to 
ensure that employees have marketable skills.  I see directors’ 
duties to employees as being more like pension rights 
protection than long-term employment safeguards. 
 
Employee representatives were less clearly opposed to bids than might have 
been thought.  Hostile bids were sometimes seen as shaking up incumbent 
managerial teams with which the employees had little by way of common 
interest.  Hence employee representatives commented unfavourably on the 
tendency of target directors to be excessively well-rewarded even before 
bids, in pay and share options, and on the negative effect this had on the 
workforce: 
 
I was very concerned about the calibre of directors we had - 
most were engineers, or old civil servants and a few marketing 
  26boys parachuted in from outside. They were not always 
competent. One thing they all shared was great share packages. 
And when the bid came in, they were primarily motivated by 
the gains they would get. They were all close to retirement. In 
my view they allowed themselves to be bound, not to say 
various things. There were 2 weeks of phoney cold war, where 
the bid was hostile, followed by agreement after a raised offer. 
 
A similar comment was as follows: 
 
Labour relations pre-bid were quite hierarchical, with the 
workforce quite isolated from the senior management. All the 
old electricity boards had a Chairman, Deputy Chairman, 
board, all way up there. When they were privatised, they 
appointed non-executive directors, who then set the salary 
levels for directors, who then reappointed the non-executive 
directors and in turn voted through their wages. Directors’ 
salaries went up from £40,000 to £60,000 per year, to £140,000 
to £215,000. That really upset the workforce, as did the share 
options for directors. 
 
Particular criticism was reserved for the practice of linking managerial 
remuneration to the number of workers dismissed: 
 
The other thing that caused trouble was the directors’ 
incentives schemes. They had a bonus system which had work 
completed according to certain targets divided by the number 
of staff that they employed to do it. So what they did was to 
sack a lot of staff, and employed outside contractors, to fulfil 
their conditions and increase their bonuses. 
 
By contrast, relations with bidders were often good.  There was evidence of 
informal consultation taking place.  One employee representative reported 
getting tacit assurances about future plans from a future managing director 
in private meetings; another stated that he received non-specific but 
basically reliable undertakings about redundancy policies from the future 
management during the bid. The target management was more elusive. One 
union whose members worked for the target reported receiving repeated 
offers from an agency employed at several removes from the target for 
under-the-table funding for opinion polls about employees’ and the public’s 
view of a foreign bid. They turned this down. Meanwhile the union reported 
that the management of the target only once directly spoke to the union 
about the bid - whilst union members were picketing an EGM, one director 
  27quietly congratulated a union representative on the union’s efforts to resist 
the bid. No formal consultation by target management with the union was 
carried out: 
 
Employees? They never came into it. I spoke to one [target] 
director once, on a picket line outside an extraordinary general 
meeting.  He shook my hand and thanked me for all I was 
doing for shareholders. I told him I was doing it for employees. 
In general, as long as the new owner tells us that they intend to 
carry on as before, the directors feel that they’ve done their job. 
In reality, employees’ interests (and differences in company 
practices) are not considered. [The target] directors never came 
to see us at all. 
 
Strikingly, none of the employee representatives were convinced that a 
higher commitment from management to consultation would have 
materially affected the bids in which they were involved.  In part this was 
out of a frank recognition that the decision was in the hands of shareholders 
and hence was ‘purely a commercial thing’.  The priority was to keep lines 
of communication open after the bid in an attempt to avoid compulsory 
redundancies and smooth the way of the new owners.  This was a typical 
comment: 
 
We take the view now that we’re not going to be able to 
prevent [the takeover] - so we try to get the best deal we can. 
Given the current industrial relations climate, I don’t think that 
even a ‘requirement to consult’ would make much difference. 
 
Several of the union respondents had been involved in bids for companies in 
the general utilities sector (water, gas and electricity). They were of the 
view that hostile takeovers had simply accelerated a wave of redundancies 
which had already been put in train within the industry.  Several welcomed 
the new management team which had come in.  In one case, the new team 
reintroduced union recognition arrangements which the target management 
had abandoned following privatization a few years previously.  Another 
respondent highlighted the issue of the share options for the workforce as a 
whole, and the way that these had muted employee, management and union 
opposition to takeovers in their industries. 
 
We had to recognise that the higher the share price went, the 
better it was for our members who had shares. Some of them 
even had to get advice on how to sell their shares in a way 
which would minimise their exposure to capital gains tax. 
  28Union officials as much as anyone else were caught by the 
attractiveness of the bid, through the big share value rise and 
the generous redundancy packages that were on offer. 
 
Some tentative findings can be drawn.  For target directors, the nature of the 
advice they received was of paramount importance.  During bids they saw 
their duty in terms of maximizing the potential value of the company as a 
financial asset of the shareholders. This obligation stood before any 
requirement to consult employees, to consider their interests, or to further 
the interests of the company as a whole. Even outside the bid period, the 
perceived ‘duty’ to focus on shareholder value could lead a non-executive 
director to see it as his role to force management to consider closing down 
the enterprise.  Correspondingly, institutional investors applauded directors 
who saw their responsibilities in these terms.   
 
The attitudes of employee representatives are best described as pragmatic.  
They expected little from target managers whose interests were seen to be 
tied up with share options and remuneration packages which would leave 
them better off whatever the outcome of the bid.  There was no expectation 
of consultation with the target management, and no prospect of it making a 
difference to the outcome of the bid if it did take place.  By contrast, the 
intervention of bidders could be seen in a positive light, particularly where 
there had already been a breakdown of trust with incumbent management.  
Informal links could be established with the bidder at an early stage, and a 
relationship constructed with a view to the future, even it was recognised on 




5.  Retrospective assessments of the outcome of mergers 
 
The evidence we have so far reported concerns near-contemporaneous 
perceptions of the takeover process.  The success or failure of takeovers 
must also be judged by the longer-term performance of merged firms.  As 
we have seen, there is some evidence to suggest that hostile bids produce 
small but positive returns over time for shareholders, by comparison with 
negative returns in the case of agreed bids (Cosh and Guest, 2001).  There is 
less evidence measuring the long-run effects of takeovers on employees and 
communities.  There is US evidence to the effect that employees with firm-
specific human capital who are displaced from employment by redundancy 
suffer long-term losses in earning capacity as a result (Schultze, 2001).   
However, this research does not separate out the effects of hostile bids from 
other causes of corporate restructuring. 
  29 
Case studies, while not necessarily representative in the way that 
quantitative studies are, can nevertheless provide useful evidence on the 
dynamics of stakeholder relations post-takeover.  Of the fifteen bids in our 
original sample, twelve led to mergers which could be meaningfully studied 
in this sense.   We analyse their effects in two parts.  First, we examine how 
far the takeovers in this sample led to job losses and short-term disposals. 
Secondly, by reviewing the informed opinion of analysts and the financial 
media, we assess whether the takeovers have been perceived to be 
successful from the point of view of creating value for shareowners.  
 
5.1 Job losses and disposals of assets 
 
The two key themes that emerge from a review of reports of events in our 
case study firms are, firstly, that in general takeovers are often followed by 
significant job losses, and secondly, that corporate activity is characterised 
by a short-term asset disposals. 
 
Significant job losses followed several of the takeovers in our case studies.  
As a result of Glaxo’s takeover of Wellcome 7,500 jobs were shed, 5,000 
being lost in the first year following the takeover.
26  Furthermore, in October 
1999, Glaxo Wellcome announced it was to shed a further 3,400 jobs, 16 
per cent of its manufacturing workforce, as part of plans to slash annual 
costs by £370 million by 2003.  Half these job losses were in the UK. 
According to the unions involved, there had been no prior consultation and 
it was ‘a unilateral decision by an arrogant management’.  Analysts 
suggested that the restructuring was welcome, but overdue, given 
overcapacity in manufacturing following the takeover.
27   
 
Another example is the announcement by Rhone-Poulenc of plans to 
eliminate 2,900 jobs from the 28,000 strong payroll by the end of 1997. The 
job cuts were intended be the most important contribution to savings of 
$200 million a year following the $4 billion acquisition of Fisons.
28  BIFU, 
the Banking Insurance and Finance Union, warned that the Lloyds/TSB 
merger, with its promised £350 million annual cost savings, would 
eventually mean that the then workforce of eight seven thousand would be 
cut by ten thousand. In April 1996 the bank announced 500 job losses at 
their head offices, and a further 3000 job losses in February 2000 which 
were directly related to the takeover. Harnischfeger’s announcement in 
1998, that it was axing 3100 jobs, or 20% of the workforce, is yet a further 
example of significant job losses in our case study firms.
29 
 
  30As well as significant job losses, several of the case studies also demonstrate 
a strategy of short-term asset disposal rather than a strategy of growing the 
entire acquired business over the long term.  Some takeovers were clearly 
aimed to produce disposals and hence value in the short term.  A key 
element of Granada’s strategy for the takeover of Forte was the proposed 
disposal within six months of Forte’s Exclusive and Meridian hotel chains 
for £1.6 billion.   More striking is the full demerger of Eastern Group from 
Hanson in February 1997, less than two years after the original takeover.  
 
Southern’s takeover of SWEB further illustrates this point. Less than twelve 
months after acquiring SWEB, Southern Company sold a 25% interest to 
another US utility company, and this was later increased to a 49% interest. 
Southern said this deal was beneficial to shareholders as it realised a small 
premium on its investment and in any case it was part of its normal strategy 
of finding minority partners for overseas acquisitions.  However, in June 
1999, Southern went a stage further and sold SWEB’s power supply 
business.
30  Again, this was argued to be beneficial Southern shareholders as 
EDF, the French utility company, paid a price above analysts’ expectations.  
At the same time the sale was seen as a response to tough regulatory price 
controls and the Government imposed windfall tax, which were said to have 
cost almost two years of SWEB’s earnings.  Furthermore, in 1999 
Southern’s chairman acknowledged that SWEB was not the type of 
investment that they would make again as it did not fit into their overall 
strategy of developing the supply business in Continental Europe.  
 
The Lloyds/TSB and Rhone-Poulenc/Fisons deals are further examples of 
takeovers characterised by asset disposals.  They also suggest that so-called 
undertakings made during the couse of a bid tend to disregarded later.   
Within six months of giving written assurances of continuing employment 
to the staff of Hill Samuel merchant bank, Lloyds set about dismantling it, 
leaving six hundred staff facing redundancy.  Although Lloyds said this was 
a useful benefit to shareholders as they had preserved a substantial part of 
the revenues but removed a considerable proportion of the costs, the 
Financial Times considered that ‘the crushing of Hill Samuel Bank has 
more significance than it represents for the dividends of Lloyds-TSB 
investors.’ According to another commentator, Hill Samuel had been ‘blown 
apart by people who do not know what they are doing.’
31  The Fisons deal 
left Rhone-Poulenc in a highly leveraged position. In the light of analysts’ 
comments that the deal had set Rhone-Poulenc back two years in terms of 
getting its balance sheet sorted out, it was little surprise that in June 1996 
Fisons’ US businesses were sold for £263 million. However, the sale was 
regarded by analysts as a short-term response in the sense that these assets 
had been considered likely to be value enhancing for Rhone-Poulenc.  
  315.2 Variable success in creating shareholder value? 
 
Notwithstanding attempts to raise value for shareholders from short-term 
disposals, there is evidence that, over the medium term which our study is 
able to take (five-six years from the merger), even hostile takeovers are in 
general not perceived as value enhancing for the shareholders of the 
acquiring companies.  We will focus here on one particularly prominent 
case, Granada’s £3.9 billion takeover of Forte.  Lauded at the time of the 
takeover, five years on this deal was seen, generally if perhaps 
controversially, to have failed to enhance shareholder value. In 2001 a 
Financial Times analysis suggested that ‘the returns for Granada have 
barely matched the group’s cost of capital and that its shareholders might 
have been better off if the deal had never been done.’
32   Total disposal 
proceeds were estimated to amount to £5.059 billion, while Travelodge and 
Little Chef, which had not been sold, were generously estimated to be worth 
£1.5 billion. Entering these figures into a discounted cash flow model gave a 
present value of £5.327 billion, just £10 million more than the total 
acquisition cost including debt of £5.317 billion. Another way of looking at 
the figures suggested that the internal rate of return was 8%, or roughly in 
line with estimates of Granada’s weighted cost of capital, suggesting that 
the deal was at best neutral for Granada shareholders. However, investment 
analysts were also of the view that if a more realistic valuation of £1 billion 
was applied to Little Chef and Travelodge ‘the takeover would appear to 
have destroyed value’.
33 The Financial Times analysis also argued that 
although the deal destroyed value for Granada shareholders, as a result of 
the takeover being so well defended ‘[u]nquestionably the Forte 
shareholders were the winners because of the massive upfront premium 
paid.’ The Financial Times suggested that the advisers to the deal were also 
clear winners, as they received an estimated £250 million in fees.
34 
 
Similarly, the £9 billion acquisition of Wellcome by Glaxo came to be 
perceived as having to have done little to enhance shareholder value. By 
August 1997 the Financial Times was declaring that, ‘Glaxo Wellcome is 
destroying shareholder value at the moment.’
35 The same article suggested 
that in five years’ time the company would be creating more value than any 
other European drug stock. This was because newly launched treatments for 
asthma, Aids and migraine would most likely replace the loss of sales 
resulting from the expiry of the US patents for its top selling Zantac and 
Zovirax products. However, this prediction proved to be excessively 
optimistic. In July 1999, Glaxo formally abandoned its double-digit growth 
target, and 11 per cent was knocked off the share value.
36 From the 
beginning of the year Glaxo underperformed the FTSE 100 Index by 24%, 
making it the index’s tenth worst performer.
37 By the end of 1999 analysts 
  32described Glaxo’s performance as ‘pedestrian’
38 and Glaxo’s 1999 results 
showed underlying pre-tax profits up just 5 per cent, compared to 11% 
earnings growth reported by SmithKline, with which Glaxo was then in the 
process of merging.  Moreover, without disposals Glaxo’s profits would 
have been virtually level with the previous year, while annual sales were up 
just 5% compared to SmithKline’s 10 per cent.
39  All of this meant that in 
comparison to SmithKline, Glaxo had looked ‘rather sickly’ over the 
previous couple of years.
40 The key problem for Glaxo was the withdrawal 
of three new drugs on safety grounds and the disappointing launch of a new 
flu drug. In answer to its own rhetorical question: ‘What has gone wrong at 
Glaxo Wellcome?’ the Financial Times concluded that the ‘uncomfortable 
answer seems to be that the company became seduced by the glamour of 
innovation to the detriment of its core competence: commercial savvy.’
41 
 
Other takeovers in our sample, such as the Rhone-Poulenc/Fisons and 
Lloyds/TSB deals, by contrast were reasonably successful at creating value 
for owners of shares in the acquiring company, but only in the short to 
medium term. At the beginning of 1996 the Financial Times said that a 
profits warning from Rhone-Poulenc had become almost an annual event 
42 
and that it had long been ‘the most unloved of pharmaceutical companies.’
43 
However, during the year net income increased by 28 per cent, earnings per 
share increased 26 per cent, dividends increased by 17 per cent
44 and the 
share price increased by 50 per cent. Analysts argued that as well as the re-
rating of the whole pharmaceuticals sector and the benefit of a number of 
favourably received new products, the takeover of Fisons had been a key 
factor. Not only were costs savings starting to come through but the deal 
had also acted as a catalyst to develop a clearer focus so that ‘ the effect 
induced by Fisons was almost as important as Fisons itself.’
45 Nevertheless, 
despite the apparent success of the Fisons deal, growth was said to be lower 
than for other drugs companies and the company felt its stock was 
undervalued. In June 1997, driven by the aim of increasing the stock market 
valuation and price/earnings ratio for the entire group, Rhone-Poulenc 
restructured by splitting itself into a life sciences company and a chemicals 
business.  Even at the time of this announcement the company and its 
financial adviser were suggesting that the best way for it to achieve its 
targeted price/earnings ratio was to do a deal with another chemicals 
company, similar to the merger between Sandoz and Ciba to form 
Novartis.
46  In 1999, this came to fruition when Rhone-Poulenc agreed to 
merge with Hoechst, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals company, 
to form a new company called Aventis, the world’s biggest life sciences 
company.  Although a full merger was originally planned over three years 
the deal was brought forward and was completed by the end of 1999. This 
  33was due to the insistence of a 25 per cent shareholder in Hoechst that 
shareholder value should be boosted as quickly as possible.
47   
 
The financial media also rated the Lloyds TSB deal was a success in 
creating shareholder value. In December 1996 analysts said that Lloyds TSB 
‘is and will remain by far the most profitable UK bank.’
48 The Financial 
Times put this down to two key advantages. First, the £400 million of 
annual cost savings from the TSB merger, most of which were still to flow 
through and which would eventually be achieved in 1999. Second, its heavy 
weighting towards high-margin retail lending.
49 Indeed the group was said 
to have set new standards of profitability, delivering to shareholders return 
on equity of 33% in 1996, and 37% in 1997 
50 However, even the Lloyds 
TSB story is not one of continual progress. By 2000 the Financial Times 
was reporting that shares had underperformed the market by 35% since their 
peak in the summer of 1998. Although it was still trading at 3.5 times book 
value, against a sector average of just 2.5 times, the premium was 
narrowing.
51 Lloyds had acquired a reputation for extracting costs and 
synergies from mergers, which had left it with one of the lowest cost-
income ratios in the industry and a return on equity above 30 percent. The 
problem, according to the Financial Times, was that fashions change and 
investors increasingly preferred banks with international growth strategies.
52 
Lloyds needed to convince investors it could grow revenue faster than its 
rivals. But, according to the Financial Times, Lloyds’ record here had been 
less impressive. Lloyds’ revenues had grown at about 6 per cent a year over 
the last decade, against 4-5 per cent for Barclays and National Westminster.
 
53 Lloyds’ stock market rating had fallen below competitors able to offer the 
prospect of top-line growth, such as HSBC, which had been buying 
aggressively in Europe and America. The result of this was Lloyds’ 
prolonged and very expensive bid for Abbey National, which ultimately 
failed on competition grounds in the course of 2001. 
 
One conclusion to be drawn from the Rhone-Poulenc and Lloyds cases is 
that even where a takeover initially appears to have been successful in 
creating shareholder value, this is insufficient to satisfy investors over the 
medium to long term. As a result the companies have had to engage in 
further corporate activity in order to satisfy demand for even greater returns. 
However, it is also clear that corporate restructuring that is driven by a 
desire to enhance shareholder value can have an entirely opposed effect. 
This point is also illustrated by the case of GEC. It is particularly difficult to 
assess the impact of GEC’s takeover of VSEL on shareholder value, given 
GEC’s highly complex corporate structure. However, following the 
takeover VSEL seems to have made steady progress and won several 
shipbuilding contracts. At the time of the takeover the Financial Times 
  34commented that the takeover made little sense apart from GEC preventing 
VSEL falling into the hands of BAe and so leaving BAe vulnerable to a 
takeover by GEC.  However, following the succession of a new managing 
director, and in pursuit of a new strategy of specialising in 
telecommunications and electronic systems, GEC sold the whole of its 
defence business to BAe in 1999.  At the end of 1999 the Financial Times 
was lauding this new strategy.  It said the former GEC, now renamed 
Marconi, was beginning to look like the high technology and high margin 
growth story promised to shareholders and that it had outperformed the 
market by 40% since the start of the year.
54  However, the result of this 
corporate restructuring, designed to enhance shareholder value, was 
ultimately the destruction of shareholder interests as financial disaster hit 
Marconi in 2001, in the wake of the severe slowdown in the high 
technology sector.  In the summer of 2002 the company had to be rescued 





At first glance, company law recognises the multi-stakeholder nature of the 
firm and the cooperation problem which it engenders: in order for the firm to 
flourish as a productive enterprise, the open-ended commitment of the 
different stakeholders is required.  This cannot be completely contracted for ex 
ante, so a space is created for implicit contracts and similar informal 
mechanisms of governance to come into play.  The legal framework has a role 
to play in providing an environment in which sustained cooperation is 
feasible.  Directors’ fiduciary duties are phrased in such a way as to make it 
possible for management to take into account of the interests of multiple 
constituencies; ‘enlightened shareholder value’ provides a focal point for 
multi-stakeholder coordination.  In principle, then, the law allows 
management to mediate, ex post, between the different implicit contractual 
claims of the various groups whose input is needed to make the corporate 
enterprise possible. 
 
The hostile takeover, by contrast, is a mechanism aimed at enhancing the 
accountability of corporate managers to just one constituency – shareholders 
(or, more precisely, shareholders in the target).  This is particularly so in the 
UK context, where the self-regulatory norms governing takeover bids, mainly 
derived from the City Code, combined with certain well-established practices 
(such as pressure to maintain pre-emption rights), impose a particularly strong 
form of the managerial passivity rule.  This is in contrast to the ‘auction’ 
orientation of US law and practice, which allows some leeway for takeover 
defences, and the more clearly pro-stakeholder approach of the recent German 
  35takeover law.  In the UK, there is no adequate mechanism for the expression 
of employee voice during the takeover process (in contrast to the position in 
respect of restructurings carried out through a business transfer: see Armour 
and Deakin, 2002).  Once a bid is launched, target management’s concerns are 
focused on the short-term, financial interests of the shareholders.  In effect, the 
open-ended fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company becomes 
a much more precise obligation to have regard to the interests of the 
shareholders in getting the best price for their shares.  As a result, there is no 
firm basis on which implicit contracts with non-shareholder constituencies can 
be maintained. 
 
The long shadow cast by the City Code in this process is crucial. The Code is 
the consequence of the mobilisation of a collective interest on the part of 
institutional shareholders and financial professionals.  The empirical evidence 
reported here suggests that those involved most immediately in takeover bids 
– directors, advisers and institutional investors – view the Code as the most 
important regulatory factor influencing bid process.  We also saw that almost 
all participants, including employee representatives, see target directors as 
acting in the short-term, financial interests of target shareholders, and that 
directors are also seen as being unable to take into consideration employees’ 
interests in continuing job security. 
 
The studies of post-bid performance demonstrate the range of possible 
trajectories for companies in the post-bid period.  Since the sample is non-
random, these studies are illustrative only.  However, it is striking that in 
many cases, measured by the standard of investor opinion, merged companies 
were struggling to live up to the expectations of the investment community at 
end of the 1990s.  This raises fundamental questions about the manner in 
which the market for corporate control currently operates in the UK.  Target 
shareholders, who effectively decide the outcome of a bid, may cede control 
in return for a premium over the market price of their shares.  Bidder 
shareholders, by contrast, have little or no opportunity to hold management to 
account.  Disenchantment ex post with the outcome of bids is a sign evidence 
of inadequate accountability ex ante between managers and shareholders in 
bidder companies.  In addition, the prioritising of financial interests over 
production interests during bids prevents managers respecting implicit 
contracts with non-shareholder constituencies, exposing their interests to 
expropriation in the form of the asset disposals and redundancies which 
almost routinely follow hostile takeovers.  It would be surprising if this 
practice had no effect at all on the willingness of employees and suppliers to 
make firm-specific investments in human capital and the joint development of 
products and services.  Further research along the lines indicated in this paper 
may be able to tell us more about the potentially negative influence of the 
  36Takeover Code on UK productivity and competitiveness, and about the 
possible repercussions of extending that model throughout the European 
Union via the Thirteenth Directive. 
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Notes 
1 In particular in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (1985), 
discussed further, below. 
2 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
3 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, General Principle 1. 
4 Ibid., rule 9.  Also relevant here are  Companies Act 1985 s. 430A providing 
a statutory right to sell where where the bidder and its associates control 
90% in value of the relevant shares, and Companies Act 1985 s. 428 on 
the bidder’s right of compulsory purchase of the last 10% of  shares. 
5 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, rule 20.1. 
6 Ibid., rule 3.1. 
7 Ibid, rule 25.1. 
8 Ibid., rule 19.2. 
9 Ibid., General Principle 9. 
10 Ibid., rule 24.1. 
11 Section 309 has given rise to a rather patchy and inconclusive case law, 
which mainly turns on whether this provision can be used by directors 
to deflect possible claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by 
disgruntled shareholders (see Parkinson, 1993).  Because employees 
have no standing to enforce the obligation apparently imposed for 
their benefit by section 309, it is not surprising that its only practical 
use to date has been to protect managers against shareholder-led 
litigation, thereby lending weight to the charge that section 309 and 
the US stakeholder statutes are merely manager-entrenchment devices 
(see Robilotti, 1997). 
12 Ibid., rule 21. 
13 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821; Parkinson, 
1993: 143. 
14 The Responsibility of Institutional Shareholders in the UK 1991, at p. 5; 
Davies, 1993: 86. 
15 Companies Act 1985, ss. 85-89. 
16   Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (1985). 
17  Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding Inc. 506 A. 2d 173 (1985).  
See also Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (1985) in which, 
exceptionally, the business judgment rule failed to protect a board 
which decided to favour one bid over another.  The crucial factor here 
appears to have been the potential conflict of interest in the role of the 
company’s own CEO in promoting the adopted bid. 
18  See in particular, Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. 571 A.2d 
1140 (1990); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.   39
 
637 A.2d 34 (1993); Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corporation 
651 A.2d 1361 (1995).  For discussion see Blair, 1994; Black and 
Kraakman, 2002; Kahan and Rock, 2002. 
19 The potential role of state-level stakeholder statutes, and the constitutional 
jurisprudence surrounding them, should also be noted in this context 
(see Orts, 1992; Mitchell, 1992; Njoya, 2002). 
20 See First National Maintenance Corp v. NLRB 452 US 666 (1981). 
21 These are found in, respectively, the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992, section 188 et seq. (implementing the EC 
Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59/EC), and the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
(implementing the EC Acquired Rights Directive, 2001/23/EC).  See 
generally Armour and Deakin, 2002. 
22 The correct reading of the Acquired Rights Directive is almost certainly 
that it has no application to mergers by share transfer, for the reasons 
examined in Armour and Deakin, 2002. 
23  See COM (2001) 77 final. 
24 See the European Parliament Daily Notebook, 4 July 2001: 
(http://www.europarl.eu.int/press/index_recherche_en.htm).  For the 
recent history of the draft Directive, with references to relevant texts 
and official documents, see 
http://europa.eu.int/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=11
887#322077. 
25  In a small number of cases, it was not feasible to conduct a study of the 
impact of the bid either because no merger resulted from it or because 
the subsequent history of the merged company made it impossible to 
trace the effects of the bid. 
26 Financial Times, 8 September 1995 
27 Financial Times, 6 October 1999 
28 Financial Times, 30 January 1996 
29 Financial Times, 27 August 1998 However, the Harnischfeger job losses 
may have been more directly related to the company’s dire financial 
position, than to the takeover of Dobson Park. 
30 SWEB’s distribution business was retained. 
31 Financial Times, 5 September 1996 
32 ‘Forte bid short-changed the Granada investors’, Financial Times 29 May 
2001 
33 Ibid. 
34 However, the Financial Times did point out that the issue of whether the 
deal created value for Granada was far from clear cut, because 
Granada made material improvements in the operation of the assets 
and pace of value realisation. It can also be argued that Granada   40
 
needed a hospitality acquisition to build up that side of the business 
with the aim of splitting it off from its media business, as has now 
been achieved. Moreover, the deal can be seen as being driven by 
earnings considerations, achieving earnings enhancement of 10% in 
the first full year of ownership. This helped bouy Granada’s share 
price, which performed in line with the FTSE 100 Index in the period 
1996-2001.  
35 Financial Times, 1 August 1997 
36 Financial Times, 30 July 1999 
37 Financial Times, 20 July 1999 
38 Financial Times, 18 November 1999 
39 Financial Times 17 February 2000 
40 Financial Times, 28 July 2000 
41 Financial Times, 4 December 2000 
42 Financial Times, 10 January 1996 
43 Financial Times, 30 January 1996 
44 Financial Times, 31 January 2001 
45 Financial Times, 19 November 1996 
46 Financial Times, 27 June 1997 
47 Financial Times, 17 March 1999 
48 Financial Times, 5 December 1996 
49 Financial Times, 27 July 1996 
50 Financial Times, 23 June 1999 
51 Financial Times, 12 February 2000 
52 Financial Times, 7 December 2000 
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